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Identity:
Absolute, Criterial, Prepositional
GORAN SlINDHOLM*
1. Frege's treatment of predication is marked by a certain tension which
comes to the fore in the way he treats of, respectively, number-words and
identity. His (negative) answer to the question 'Drückt das Zahlwon "Ein "
eine Eigenschaft von Gegenständen aus?' is that count-nouns are unsaturated
and stand in need of completion by means of a general concept.' Indeed,
Frege notes, ein Weiser is not somebody who is one and who is wise. Simi-
larly, the exclamation: 'There are two!" makes no sense without it being
possible to answer the counter-question "Two whatT The answer will be
given using a term 'a' which expresses a type (Russell, Whewell).2 In order to
know a type (understand a type-word) one must, of course, know its criterion
of application. This, however, on its own, is not sufficient: "No entity without
identity," quips Quine,3 but Frege himself had seen the need for an additional
criterion of identity.4
Consider the two types N+x N+ of ordered pairs of positive integers and
Q+ of positive rationals. Formally they have the same application criterion:
* Text of an invited contribution (o LOGICA '98, Castle Ublice. Czech Republic, June 23-26,
1998.
1
 Gl, §29. Reference to the 'great works of Frege1 is made through the use of self-explanatory
abbreviations, listed by Michael Dummett, I-'rege: Philttsttphy t>f Language (second edition),
Duckworth, London, 1981, p. xxvii.
2
 Alternative terminology here includes: category (Dummett), set (Cantor), sort (Locke) and
universal (general) concept (St. Thomas Aquinas). The computer scientist's
p a and /j = 9 : a
will be used to indicate that /? is an element or a, and chat p and </ are equal such elements,
respectively. The set theoretic
p e ot and p = q e a
would serve equally well.
•' 'Speaking of objects', originally published in 1956, but cited from in: Onli>lt>!>ical Relativity.
N.Y., Columbia U.P , 1968, pp. 1-25, at p. 23.
4
 The Serm "criterion of identity1' is due to Frege, Gl §62. Michael Dummett, Frege: Pluttisapln
uf Luni<uaiie, Duckworth, London 1973, passim, adds "criterion of application". The criteria of
application and identity are rules for how to make certain judgements with respect to the type—
or category—ct. Per Martin-Lof pointed out, in unpublished lectures at Leyden, autumn 1993,
that the term "critierion" is particularly apt, since it derives from the Greek for judgement.
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(2,3) and <4, 6} are equal elements of type Q+, but not of the type N+ x N*.
In order to individuate the types in question different criteria of identity are
needed: the type N+x N* is individuated by the identity criterion
(p, <j) = <r, j> : N* x N*,
and the type Q+ by the criterion
/ i :N + < / : N + r : N* i : N*
2. Frege's conception of predication, identity and quantification, on the other
hand, is absolute with respect to the universe of objects and not restricted to
types:
(1) Predicates are regimented as functions which have uniform sense
throughout the universe and with values among only the two
truth-values das Wahre and das Falsche.
(2) Types have no special status, but are ordinary predicates:
"p is an a" is regimented as *'o(a)".
Hence,
(3) the identity predicate £ = rj is an ordinary two-place function and its
rules of inference are uniform throughout the universe of objects:
a = a true And =E) a = b true <ti[a/x] true
<t>[b!x] true.1
5
 When matters of notation are not al issue, I allow myself to accommodate the formal languages
of Frcge, Rüssel] and Whitehead lo modem standards The use of natural deduction rules at this
point is certainly unFregean: mutans mutandis, though, the point made remains valid.
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(4) Restricted identity "a is the same a as b" is regimented in terms of
unrestricted identity "a(a) and a(b) and a = fV'.6
(f) The restricted quantification "All a are <F' is regimented in terms of the
unrestricted quantification "Vjt(a(.<:} o <P(jr.))".
3. Frege's arguments that type distinctions (and restrictions) are superfluous
are not strong; in fact, given his exacting standards, they are uncommonly
weak. One uses what Quine has dubbed don't care cases.7
So long as the only objects dealt with in arithmetic are the integers, the
letters a and b in 'a + b' indicate only integers; the plus-sign need be de-
fined only between integers. Every extension of the field to which the ob-
jects indicated by a and b belong obliges us to give a new definition of the
plus-sign. ... It is thus necessary to lay down rules from which it follows,
e.g., what
'©+!'
stands for, if '®' is to stand for the Sun. What rules we lay down is a
matter of comparative indifference; but it is essential thai we should do
so—that 'a + b' should always have a Bedeutung, whatever signs for
definite objects may be inserted in place of *a ' and 'b '.*
So, according to Frege (and his follower Quine), we do not need any type
distinctions in the universe, because one can always effect a don't care exten-
sion of a type restricted function or predicate, using a throw-away value for
the indifferent cases. However, an actual attempt to effect such an indifferent,
more or less arbitrary choice of a rule reveals an awkward difficulty Con-
sider, say, the following definition of a very simple function, which attempts
to carry out a throwaway distinction of cases:
=def
k + 1, if x - k and k is a natural number
213, if xis nota natural number.
fi
 "Die Identität ist eine so bestimme gegebene Beziehung, dass nicht abzusehen ist. wie bei ihr
verschiedene Arten vorkommen können", Gg. II. p 254 For an opposite view, see Anstotle.
Metaphysics, A, \ 2, 1018 a 35- 39
'And since "one" and "being" have various meanings, all other terms which are used in
relation to "one" and "being" must vary in meaning with them, and so "same", "other" and
"contrary" must so vary and so must have a separate meaning in accordance with each cate-
gory-' I am indebted to Per Martin-Lof lor drawing my attention lo this passage from Anslolle.
7
 Ward and Objea, M !.T Press, [960 (1976"), § 38.
"FB, p. 19.
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This determination, however, of the don't care — throw-away — value requires
a separation of cases according to whether the argument x is a natural number
or not, that is, according to the very type-distinction, the avoidance of which
was the whole point of Frege's exercise.'
4. Russell partly accepts and partly rejects Frege's absolutism. The Doctrine
of Types does, of course, introduce a plethora of type distinctions, but within
each type Rüssel! largely accepts the Fregean paradigm. In particular, identity
of individuals is defined using second level quantification:
where, given the Axiom of Reducibility, we may remove the exclamation
marks.10 Furthermore, in Russell, by definition, the types serve as the ranges
of significance for prepositional functions and they also serve as the domains
of quantification.
5. Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, further challenges Frege's absolutism. Identity,
in that work, has the task, not to mirror reality, but to license substitutions." The
Tractarian theory looks back towards Frege's early theory of identity from the
Begriffsschrift, where 's' expresses, not identity of Bedeutungen, but sameness
of content (InhaltsgleicHheit). There Frcge wants to eat his cake and have it. For
instance, according to his conventions, the Bs theorem
(52) — f =
should be taken in the sense of its universal closure
<52') I — VrWfc = d ^  (J(c) => f (d))).
The Bs §8 explanation of Inhaltsgleichheit
'c = d' means " V and 'i>' have the same content"
turns (52') into
(52") ! — VcVdfa' and 'b' have the same content 3 f/(c) 3 ƒ(<ƒ))).
* Frege's other argument is no better ll is spelt out as Gg Ü, $65, pp. 77-78. David Bell, Fred's
Theurv ttj Judgement, O.U P., 1979, pp. 45-47 offers a lucid refutation of this and the above FB
argument.
'" Prinapia Malfiemaliui, Vol. l, Cambridge U.P., 1910, * 13.01.
"4.241-4.243.
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This formula, however, does not make sense, since quotations-marks, notori-
ously, resist "quantifying in".
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, explicitly acknowledges that the substitu-
tion-licensing notion of identity is not propositional in nature and accordingly
removes the identitites from the realm of propositions.': Therefore, identities
are not open to quantification in the Traciatus, since the quantifers can be
applied only to propositional Urbilder.
6. For Russell, each propositional function, also that of identity, has a type as
its range of significance. Accordingly, his view of predication, identity and
quantification is a type-restricted one. Peter Geach famously concurs with
respect to the identity-predicate: according to him it also requires supple-
mentation with a type-indication." The assertion: "They are the same" invites
Geach's inevitable counter-question: "The same WHAT?" which certainly
merits an answer. Geach, however, went one step further, and held that iden-
tity is not just type-restricted: according to him, it is even type-relative. This
means that for some a and b they are the same a but different ß. I cannot
follow him in this: he is right concerning the restricledness, but goes too far
with relativity. Examples of purported relativity have been offered by Geach
and others.14 Here I wish to defuse one of them. The example has already
been given in section 1 above: according to the identity-relativist (2, 3} is the
same rational number as (4, 6), but they are not the same ordered pairs of
natural numbers. This will only work if (2, 3), say, is an element both of
N*x N* and of Q+. When the (token) '(2, 3}' stands for an ordered pair in
N+ x N+, however, it cannot, at the same time, stand for an element of Q*.
because when it stands for an element of type N+x N+, it obeys the identity
criterion of this type, and not that of Q*. It is an internal property of elements
of a type that they obey the identity criterion of that type and not that of an-
other. Similarly, when students of biochemistry at Helsinki University use
certain tokens of the singular term 'Professor Göran Sundholm' to refer to
their teacher, my exact namesake, they cannot at the very same time use the
very same tokens to refer to me. Such considerations will serve to defuse the
standard examples of relative identity." The relativity theorists forget that
criteria of identity only operate against the background of equally important,
but prior, criteria of application. Indeed, as Per Martin-Löf has noted, 'no
entity without identity' is most readily obtained by combining the type doc-
" 6.23, 6.232, 6.2322.
15
 Reference and Generality, Cornell UP., 1962.
14
 Among whom Nicholas Gnffin, Relume Identity. 0 U .P , 1977
ls
 David Wiggins, Sumene^ und Substance, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, Ch 1, gives a compre-
hensive list of examples of allegedly relative identity and, after careful scrutiny, rightly rejects
the claim for each case.
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trine 'no entity without type' and 'no type without identity', that is, the point
that each type is given by, i.a.. a criterion of identity.16
7 David Wiggins resists relativity: we cannot have p = q : a. but p * q • ß.
where a and ß are different types (or categories).17 He is, however, prepared
to accept the restrictedness of identity in the forms
a = b ID 3f(a =f b)
and
3f(a =f
Though at one with Wiggins in preferring restrictedness and rejecting relativ-
ity, I cannot follow him in his use of these formulae. In the second formula.
types are used as if they were common propositional functions amenable to
quantification. A propositional function P however has a negation — \P. which
is also a prepositional function. P(a) and — J*(a) are both propositions, when
P is a propositional function with respect to a certain domain D and a belongs
to that domain. Types, however, are not closed under negation. There is no
common identity criterion for non-crows, or non-natural numbers, or what
have you.
Furthermore, even :f we accepted the types as propositional functions, the
existential quantification with respect to types that Wiggins employs is im-
predicative, and I. for one, have great difficulty in accepting such quantifica-
tion as meaningful, owing to the vicious circularity in the meaning-expla-
nations.19
8. The way out of the corner into which I have painted myself is to draw the
tripartite distinction of my title. For each suitable domain D we have a propo-
sitional function
ido(jc, y) : Prop, provided that x : D and y : D.20
i f >
 In (he Leyden lectures referred to above.
17
 Op e tc . f.n 15
'* Swmenes.T and Substance, op. cit. f n ] 5. al p. 58 and p 18.
'^  I have deal! with the problem of impredicativily m some detail in my 'Intuitiomsm and logical
tolerance', in: Jan Vvolenski and Eckehart Köhler (eds.). Alfred Tankî and tire Viennii Circle.
Yearbook ut :he Vienna Cinte Institute 6. Kluwer. Doldrecht. 1998. pp. 135-US.
211
 In order to be suitable the domain has to be inductively generated from below, so as to avoid
problems of impredicativity.
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These meaning of these prepositional functions is uniform in the chosen do-
main D:
the rules
(idDI) a: D And (id0 E) Id0 (a. b) true <P[q/.t| Irue
idD (a, a) true <t> \blx\ true
hold irrespective of the choice of D.
Like any prepositional function the proposilional function \AD has a cer-
tain range of significance which is a type, in casu the lype D. Hence, the type
D is prior in the conceptual order to the propositional functions in general
which have D for their range of significance and to id/> in particular. But the
criteria! identity =, which is used in formulating the identity criteria of the
form p - q : D, is prior to the lype D. Accordingly, in virtue of their different
locations in the conceptual order:
criteria! identiy and proposilional identity are not the same.
9. The notion of identity, on the other hand, which is used here in formulating
the conclusion, is neither the criterial nor the propositional one. It is an in-
stance of the Medieval transcendentale idem and this third notion of identi ty
is the true notion of ABSOLUTE identity, a notion for which it holds, as
Wittgenstein remarked, that
to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one
thing that it identical with itself says nothing at all.21
Göran Sundholm
Institute for Philosophy
P.O.Box 9515
Leyden University
NL-230U RA Leyden
The Netherlands
sunholm@pop.wsd.LeidenUniv.nl
21
 5 5303. Concerning the (ranseendental, absolute idem, see Günther Schulemann. Die
vtm den TranKcendetitalien in tier Schofastisck&l Philosophie
 t Feîix Meiner, Leipzig, 1929
